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DOES THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE THAT
THE HUSBAND IS SOLELY LIABLE FOR
THE TORT OF HIS WIFE, COMMITTED IN
HIS PRESENCE ON THE THEORY THAT
THE WIFE WAS PRIMA FACIE PRESUMED
TO BE ACTING UNDER HIS INFLUENCE
AND COERCION, STILL PREVAIL IN THIS
STATE?
F. X. SWIETLIK,
Member of the Milwaukee Bar.
Numerous and radical changes have been made in recent years
with respect to the legal status of married women when compared
with their status as it existed under the Common Law. Some of
these changes appear in legislative enactments, others are reflected
in judicial decisions. The Common Law theory that the legal
status of married women was completely merged in that of their
husbands' has been swept aside and married women today are
independent agents, exercising their own individual influence
without hindrance on the part of their husbands.
In spite of this emancipation of married women, circumstances
nevertheless arise involving the husband's liability for the acts
of his wife which must be solved without the aid of legislative or
judicial precedents, for example: Does the Common Law doctrine
which made the husband solely liable for the tort committed by
his wife, if committed in his presence on the theory that she was
presumed prima facie to be acting under his influence and coercion,
still prevail in this state?
While our Supreme Court has never had occasion to pass upon
this question, and it is very difficult to find precedents in point
in other jurisdictions, nevertheless, in very numerous decisions
relating to the husband's liability for the acts of his wife courts
have had occasion to use language from which one must draw the
necessary inference that the presence of the husband while the
wife is committing a tort, providing that she is not acting under
his express direction, does not change the rule regarding the hus-
band's liability for his wife's tort. If the husband is exempt
from responding for his wife's conduct towards others, no suffi-
cient reason exists why this exemption should not remain in effect
where the wife injures others in his presence.
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It is an old maxim of the Common Law that "cessante ratione,
cessat lex". If we refer back to the Common Law and consider
the legal disabilities surrounding a married woman, we will easily
understand the reason for the added responsibility and liability of
the husband for the acts of his wife. Under the Common Law
the husband was the sole master of the personal property of his
wife; he was entitled to the rents and profits accruing from her
real estate; he could reduce to his possession her choses in action,
providing he did so during the lifetime of his wife; she was unable
to enter into any contractual relations; she could not sue or be
sued. In other words, her legal existence was merged in that of
her husband and, as was well stated by the Supreme Court of
Kansas, "she was sunk into almost absolute nonentity and rested
in almost total disability".
Speaking of the changed conditions of the wife under modern
statutes as compared with her legal position under the Common
Law, our Supreme Court in the case of Wright Lumber Co. vs.
McCord, 145 Wis. 93, uses the following language:
"Our statutes have endowed married women with very
full and complete rights, not only as to their separate prop-
erty, but also as to their liberty of conduct, and have given
them practically perfect freedom to deal with property, to
contract for their personal services, to conduct their sepa-
rate business, to bring suit for the enforcement of their
rights, and generally to control their own actions without let
or hindrance from their husbands. With these rights nec-
essarily come some added responsibilities. Privilege and
opportunity always bring with them corresponding duties.
When a woman's personality was considered to be submerged
in that of her husband, it might well be held that she should
be held to be under no responsibility for her acts; but when
she stands on a level with her husband and becomes prac-
tically master of her own property and destiny, it seems plain
that she must logically be charged with the duties and re-
sponsibilities which attend every other free and independent
personality in its dealings with its peers. 2 Pomeroy Eq. Jar.
(3rd Ed.) Sec. 815."
"If, therefore, the relation of husband and wife has been so
changed as to deprive him of all right to her property and to the
control of her person and her time, every principle of right would
be violated to hold him still responsible for her conduct. If she
is emancipated he should not be enslaved." Martin vs. Robson,
65 Ill. 129.
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If we examine Chapter io8 of the Revised Statutes of Wiscon-
sin, which is entitled "Property. Rights of Married Women," we
find that nowhere have the legislatures enacted statutes more
sweeping in their innovations and inroads upon the Common Law
as it affects married women than has the legislature in Wisconsin.
This chapter gives the wife sole ownership and control in and over
all of her real and personal property and makes it "not subject
to the disposal of her husband". It recognizes the dual person-
ality of husband and wife and a dissolution of such fictitious union
of person as existed at Common Law by providing that "any
conveyance, transfer or lien executed by either husband or wife
to or in favor of the other shall be valid to the same extent as be-
tween other persons". It confers upon the wife the right to her in-
dividual earnings, freed of disposition or control by her husband.
It provides further that the wife may sue and be sued in her own
name. It abrogates by express enactment the Common Law doc-
trine that a husband is liable for the ante-nuptial debts of his wife.
There can be no doubt but that it was the intention of the legis-
lature, when it enacted these various statutes, to completely eman-
cipate the wife from her Common Law disability and at the same
time to emancipate the husband from his Common Law respon-
sibility for his wife's conduct. It is also clear in the light of these
statutes that there can be no reason for holding a husband respon-
sible for the torts of his wife, even though they be committed in
his presence, if he does not participate in them or direct and
countenance their commission.
The fundamental reason for holding a husband liable alone for
a tort committed by his wife, whether in his presence or in his
absence, was the fact that the wife's personality was completely
merged in that of her husband and for that reason she could not
be sued for her wrong. Under that doctrine, whenever a wife
committed a wrong the injured person would be without legal
redress unless he could hold the husband responsible for her
wrong. Our statutes, as shown above, have removed that dis-
ability and have made it possible to sue the wife in her own name.
Since the reason for the old Common Law rule has vanished, it fol-
lows that the law must be considered as no longer in existence.
In the case of Jones vs. Monson, 137 Wis. 478, in which an
action was brought against a husband and wife for depriving the
plaintiff of his wife's affections, the Court uses the following
language: "We are not familiar with the supposed rule counsel
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contends for that a wife is incapable of being guilty of a wrong
jointly with her husband, because of the ancient presumption that
what a wife does in that regard in the husband's presence or so
nearby as to be within his influence, is presumed to be under
coercion of his will. That doctrine so far as it existed and is not
obsolete, relates to a mere rebuttable presumption, not disability."
This language, while it does not clearly answer the question
under discussion, surely throws a doubt on the existence of the
old Common Law doctrine that what a wife does in her husband's
presence is presumed to be under coercion of his will.
In the case of Huber vs. Seeger, 161 Wis. 135, it was held that
a married woman is responsible for a tort committed by her when
not under coercion by her husband. This decision amounts to an
abrogation of the old Common Law doctrine that the tort of the
wife was always the husband's tort, but it does not throw much
light on the question under consideration because anyone who
coerces another to commit a tort is liable as a matter of law as
a joint tort feasor.
Sect. 2969 R. S. of Wis., Subd. 9, provides:
"When an execution shall be issued upon a judgment
against husband and wife in any action or proceeding in which
they shall have been joined as defendants, to recover dam-
ages for any tort committed by the wife alone, it shall be
levied upon and satisfied out of the property and effects of
the wife only, and the attorney, clerk or other officer issuing
execution in any such action, shall endorse thereon a direction
to the sheriff or other officer, to collect the same from her
property and effects only."
Under this section if one commences suit against the husband
and wife for a tort committed by the wife, whether in his presence
or not, and recovers judgment against both for the tort of the
wife, he is compelled to collect his judgment out of the property
of the wife alone. Can it be said then that the plaintiff can cir-
cumvent the provisions of this statute by omitting to make the
wife a party to the suit where the wife alone commits the tort?
In addition to the enactment of the married women's act and
the various decisions of our court regarding the legal status of
married women, another step has been taken in the emancipation
of women from the legal limitations that have surrounded them
in the past. The Constitution of the United States has been
amended so as to grant the unlimited right of franchise to all
women married or unmarried who are otherwise qualified under
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the law to exercise this right. It may seem at first blush that this
is something not germane to this question, but it is safe to assume
that the courts of this country will not close their eyes to the fact
that this constitutional amendment has raised women to a plane
of complete civil and political equality with men. It has not only
given them a voice in the choice of legislators, but has made them
eligible to jury service and made it possible for them to be elected
to any office of honor or trust within the gift of the people.
The foregoing authorities setting forth the constitutional and
statutory provisions, changing the legal status of married women,
as compared with their status under the Common Law, clearly
establishes the fact that the old doctrine which gave rise to the
prima facie presumption that every tort committed by a married
woman in the presence of her husband was committed by his con-
sent and under his coercion and made him solely liable for such
tort, has been abrogated and is no longer the law in this state.
